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On evolutionary stability in predator–prey models
with fast behavioural dynamics
Vlastimil Krˇivan1 and Ross Cressman2
1Department of Theoretical Ecology, Institute of Entomology,
Academy of Sciences of the Czech Republic and Department of Mathematics and Biomathematics,
Faculty of Science, University of South Bohemia, Cˇeské Budeˇjovice, Czech Republic and
2Department of Mathematics, Wilfrid Laurier University, Waterloo, Ontario, Canada
ABSTRACT
Question: Does optimality in predator–prey models with plastic traits evolving on a fast
time-scale imply evolutionary stability?
Mathematical methods: Predator–prey models of population growth described by differential
equations with controls and feedback regulation. G-function.
Key assumptions: Plastic responses of organisms to changes in environment are adaptive
in the sense that they maximize individual fitness. Population dynamics are deterministic and
described by the Lotka-Volterra type dynamics.
Predictions: Adaptive plastic responses do not necessarily lead to evolutionary stability.
Mutants with a different strategy can invade a monomorphic resident population, but they
cannot replace residents.
Keywords: adaptive foraging, evolutionarily stable strategies, G-function, game theory,
ideal free distribution, population dynamics, predator–prey games.
INTRODUCTION
A central challenge in ecology is to develop models that faithfully capture those important
mechanistic details of natural systems that are required to make reliable predictions about
population community structure and dynamics. This requires integration of processes that
run on three different time-scales: individual, population, and evolutionary. The individual
time-scale comprises phenotypic plasticity that produces behaviourally flexible phenotypes
as a response to changing environment (Miner et al., 2005). The population time-scale is
concerned with population dynamics that manifest on a slower time-scale than behavioural
responses. The evolutionary time-scale focuses on slow trait changes due to mutation and
selection processes. This trichotomy led to separation of these three research programmes
that currently correspond to behavioural ecology, population ecology, and evolutionary
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ecology. To unify these programmes, several theoretical approaches that are based on time-
scale separation have been developed. One of the first approaches to use time-scale
separation is the early work on the functional response that integrates some details
of animal behaviour (e.g. pursuit and capture of a prey by predator) with population
dynamics (Holling, 1966). This work still treats animal behaviour in a very rudimentary way, as
it only implicitly defines behavioural mechanisms by which predators select their prey. More
explicit treatments of behavioural effects on population dynamics focused on diet selection,
habitat selection, and activity budget (for a review, see Bolker et al., 2003). These works assume that
animal behaviour maximizes fitness at the current population densities. Similarly, there is a
long line of research on the interface between the population and evolutionary time-scale.
For instance, Vincent and Brown (2005) use a separation of population vs. evolutionary
time-scale for their Darwinian dynamics (that assumes population densities are at stable
equilibrium given the current phenotype distribution) to examine the evolutionary stability
of population behaviours through their G-function approach (see also Cohen et al., 1999).
Similarly, the adaptive dynamics approach (e.g. Dieckmann and Law, 1996; Geritz et al., 1997, 1998; Abrams,
2005) produces a canonical equation to model trait evolution at population equilibrium.
In this article, we are interested in combining these three time-scales. We study some
predator–prey models in which individual behaviour can change rapidly within a single
generation, since these behaviours are given by strategies such as habitat choice or foraging/
predating activity levels that individuals may change many times during their lifetime. In
fact, we assume that changes in behaviour run on a much faster time-scale than changes in
population density. At the behavioural time-scale, fitness is instantaneously maximized,
which leads to the Nash equilibrium (Nash, 1951) or, if it exists, the evolutionarily stable
strategy (ESS) (Maynard Smith and Price, 1973). The Nash equilibrium is the optimal strategy that
maximizes individual fitness in the sense that, if all individuals in a given population use this
strategy, then an individual with another strategy cannot get a higher fitness. In addition to
being a Nash equilibrium, the ESS requires that any other strategy that does as well as the
resident strategy cannot invade the resident population and must die. We remark that
the ESS was originally defined for a single species only, while the Nash equilibrium can
be applied to any number of interacting populations. The extension of the evolutionary
stability concept to the multiple species setting is more complicated and was introduced
only recently (e.g. Cressman, 1992; Vincent and Brown, 2005). Population dynamics are assumed to
operate on an intermediate time-scale and are modelled by a set of differential equations.
Population dynamics together with behavioural dynamics correspond to a resident-trait
dynamics. The question of primary interest to us is on the evolutionary stability of the
resident-trait system, i.e. whether mutants playing a different strategy can invade the
resident system or not. To this end, we analyse several Lotka-Volterra predator–prey
models with adaptive predator and/or prey strategies.
Our first general conclusion is that, although mutant strategies can survive, they cannot
drive out the residents. Second, the combined resident–mutant system displays the same
long-term behaviour as the resident system when this latter system has a globally stable
attractor (e.g. a stable equilibrium or family of limit cycles). This yields a dynamic
interpretation of the evolutionary stability of adaptive systems even in the case when these
systems periodically fluctuate.
Our models fall in the category of systems that we call ‘population game models’. This
name emphasizes the fact that these models combine game-theoretical approaches with
population dynamics. In other words, these models aim to unify three major ecological
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disciplines: behavioural ecology, population ecology, and evolutionary ecology. In con-
nection with our previous results (Cressman et al., 2004; Abrams et al., 2007), our models clearly show
that a complex feedback loop exists between these three different time-scale processes. In
particular, animal behaviour can have strong effects on population dynamics, which in turn
influences animal behaviour and evolutionary processes.
EVOLUTIONARY STABILITY IN DENSITY-DEPENDENT POPULATION MODELS
In this article, we explore evolutionary stability of strategies in multiple populations
that undergo population dynamics. If x = (x1, . . . , xn) denotes the vector of population
densities of n populations, then typically these models have the form
x˙ i = x i fi (x, u), i = 1, . . . , n (1)
where u = (u1, . . . , uk) ∈ U = U
1 × . . . × Uk ⊂ Rm is a control vector given in terms of
phenotypically plastic traits (Miner et al., 2005) with values in given sets U i and fi (x, u) is
individual fitness in species i (i.e. it is the per capita population growth rate of this species).
Such traits can correspond to changes in species’ behaviour, physiology, morphology,
life-history, and so on.
We assume throughout that each population has at most one plastic trait. In this section,
without loss of generality, we then order populations in model (1) so that the first k
populations are those with plastic traits. Thus, when k < n, there are some populations
without plastic traits. It is also assumed in this article that these traits respond to the current
environment (i.e. to population density x) in such a way that individual fitness maximizes,
i.e. u i is a trait for species i for which fi (x, u) is maximized.
In frequency-dependent models, optimality is understood in the sense of evolutionarily
stable strategies (Maynard Smith and Price, 1973), i.e. a strategy that is resistant to invasion of
mutants that use a different strategy. Model (1) is then called the monomorphic resident
system where all individuals are using their current optimal strategy. The ESS was defined
for a single population only and its extension to multiple species is more difficult (but see
Cressman, 1992; Krˇivan et al., 2008). Instead, in our multiple species context, optimality will be
understood in the sense of the Nash equilibrium. If all resident individuals use this strategy,
no individuals have an incentive to switch to another strategy. To calculate these optimal
strategies, it is useful to follow the terminology of Vincent and Brown (2005), who defined,
for those populations that show adaptive traits, the so-called G-function that satisfies
G i (u i ; u, x) = fi (x, u) for every species i = 1, . . . , k. Then, for every population density
vector x, fitness maximization provides us with a set of Nash equilibria:
N (x) = {u ∈ U | G i (u i ; u, x) ≥ G i (v; u, x) for any v ∈ U i, i = 1, . . . , k} . (2)
Thus, together with model (1) we consider trait dynamics
u ∈ N (x) (3)
and call (1) combined with (3) the resident population-trait dynamics. It is important to
note that this concept involves two time-scales. As (3) assumes that the optimal trait value
changes instantaneously with changing population densities, trait dynamics are assumed
to be infinitely faster than population dynamics (1). As the map that associates to every
population density the corresponding optimal strategy N (x) is multi-valued, the question
arises if solutions to resident population-trait dynamics exist. Because N (x) is upper
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semi-continuous and convex valued (Aubin and Cellina, 1984) for continuous G-functions, resident
population-trait dynamics have solutions for every initial population density (Aubin and Cellina,
1984; Filippov, 1988; Colombo and Krˇivan, 1993).1
For models that we consider in the following sections, the map N (x) is typically set-
valued for some population densities. In a single species context, if there are several Nash
equilibria, finding ESSs corresponds to a selection procedure that chooses only those that
are stable with respect to possible invasions of monomorphic mutants. This selection
procedure is based on frequency dependence of the fitness function. However, in our
examples, there is no direct frequency dependence of the fitness function on the resident
strategy. In particular, for our predator–prey models, the resident predator population sets
the resource level, which in turn defines the fitness function of a predator mutant that uses a
different strategy. In other words, the resident strategy does not explicitly appear in the
mutant fitness function. This excludes the possibility of selection of some strategies (such as
those that are evolutionarily stable) on frequency-dependent grounds. On the other hand,
we show that it is often possible to reduce the set of Nash equilibria on the basis of density
dependence. It turns out that, at those points where N (x) is set-valued in our examples,
trajectories of the resident population-trait dynamics are constrained to stay on a lower
dimensional manifold described by continuous maps g i : R
n  R, i = 1, . . . , l
M = {x ∈ Rn | g1(x) = 0, . . . , gl(x) = 0} . (4)
Invariance of this manifold under the resident population-trait dynamics selects a subset
S(x) of N (x) that provides us with a single strategy in many cases.
In this article, we concentrate on the evolutionary stability of predator–prey systems.
That is, in analogy with the evolutionary stability of a single-species ESS at fixed population
density, we investigate whether mutants can successfully invade the residents. In what
follows, we will assume that every population with an adaptive trait can be invaded by a
single mutant only, but the analysis can be extended to the case of multiple mutants. The
population dynamics of our resident–mutant system then have the form
dx i
dt
= x iG i (u i ; u, x, u˜, x˜), i = 1, . . . , k
dx˜ i
dt
= x˜ iG i (u˜ i ; u, x, u˜, x˜), i = 1, . . . , k (5)
dx i
dt
= x i fi (x, x˜, u, u˜), i = k + 1, . . . , n
where x˜ = (x˜1, . . . , x˜k) is the density vector of the mutant populations that use some given
strategy u˜ = (u˜1, . . . , u˜k) (that may also depend on current densities x, x˜). Together with
these population dynamics, we consider trait dynamics that now depend also on mutant
trait and density, i.e.
u ∈ N (x, x˜, u˜) = {u ∈ U | G i (u i ; u, x, u˜, x˜) ≥ G i(v; u, x, u˜, x˜) for any v ∈ U i, i = 1, . . . , k} .
(6)
1 We remark that in this article we do not need to use the Filippov concept of a solution for a differential equation
with a discontinuous right-hand side, as our resident population-trait dynamics have a solution in the usual sense.
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As in the resident-only system, the set of all Nash equilibria for given population densities
and mutant strategy can be reduced if population dynamics are to stay on a set M, which
eventually leads to the resident strategy set S(x, x˜, u˜).
A priori, there are several possibilities for general multi-species resident–mutant
population-trait dynamics (5) and (6). The resident–mutant system can converge to
a population equilibrium, or the attractor can be more complex. Whether or not population
dynamics settle on an equilibrium, there are three possibilities: (1) mutants die out; (2) both
mutants and residents of some species co-exist and no residents die out, which leads to
an extended polymorphism; or (3) some mutants replace residents, which corresponds to
evolutionary instability. The fact that population dynamics of the resident–mutant system
may not converge to an equilibrium, or strategies that maximize fitness are not unique,
considerably complicate the analysis and immediately bring up the problem of what is the
meaning of evolutionary stability (as strategies that are stable with respect to invasion) in
these situations. We postpone a discussion of these issues until the following section where
concrete predator–prey examples are introduced and analysed.
However, we can answer already one question for these general models; namely,
whether mutants can spread in the population and replace the residents. From (5), it is
straightforward to show that
d(x˜ i /x i)
dt
=
x˜ i
x i
(G i(u˜ i ; u, x, u˜, x˜) − G i(u i ; u, x, u˜, x˜)) ≤ 0 (7)
for i = 1, . . . , k when u ∈ S(x, x˜, u˜) is the optimal strategy. Thus, the proportion of mutants
in species i never increases for i = 1, . . . , k and so this proportion can never be higher than
it is initially. In particular, mutants cannot replace residents who use an optimal strategy.
However, the above inequality does not exclude the possibility that mutants survive in the
system or that the presence of mutants fundamentally alters how the multi-species system
evolves (that is, the resident–mutant population-trait dynamics may be qualitatively differ-
ent from the resident population-trait dynamics). We examine both these issues in the
following predator–prey examples.
PREDATOR–PREY MODELS WHERE THE PREDATOR HAS AN ADAPTIVE PLASTIC TRAIT
In this section, we study two predator–prey models where adaptive predators make a choice
of habitat or a choice of diet respectively. We again are most interested in the evolutionary
stability of the optimal strategies in the two models.
Two-patch predator–prey model where predators are adaptive foragers
Following the model developed by Krˇivan (1997), the monomorphic resident Lotka-Volterra
predator–prey model with only predators moving between two patches is
dx1
dt
= x1(r1 − λ1v1x3)
dx2
dt
= x2(r2 − λ2v2x3) (8)
dx3
dt
= x3(e1v1x1 + e2v2x2 − m) .
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Here x i is the density of prey species i (= 1, 2) that inhabit patch i exclusively; x3 is the
density of the predator population whose members are all using the foraging strategy
v = (v1, v2), where v i is the proportion of time each predator forages in patch i (v1 + v2 = 1).
2
In fact, for our adaptive residents, the optimal foraging strategy v is for all predators to
inhabit the better patch from their perspective (i.e. the patch with higher e ix i). Thus, the
optimal predator strategy satisfies
{1} if e1x1 > e2x2
(9)v1 ∈ N (x) =

{0} if e1x1 < e2x2
{u1 | 0 ≤ u1 ≤ 1} if e1x1 = e2x2 .
In particular, when both patches are equally profitable for predators, any resident
predator distribution is possible. Thus, the map N (x) at these prey densities is an interval
[0, 1].
These results can also be seen from the game-theoretic perspective in terms of the
predator’s G-function. Here, the fitness of an individual predator with strategy v = (v1, v2)
in a resident population with strategy u = (u1, u2) is G(v; u, x) = e1v1x1 + e2v2x2 − m =
(e1x1 − m)v1 + (e2x2 − m)v2. G does not depend directly on the mean strategy u of the
resident population, or on its own species density. The dependence is indirect through
prey population densities that depend on the resident predator strategy through the resident
population dynamics (8). Thus, at fixed population density x = (x1, x2, x3), we have a
‘game against nature’ (Maynard Smith, 1982) with G(v; u, x) = 〈v, B(x)〉 = v1B1 + v2B2 where
B(x) = (B1, B2) = (e1x1 − m, e2x2 − m). The optimal strategy in a game against nature is
the strategy corresponding to the largest B i. To examine the evolutionary stability of this
optimal strategy, we consider the resident–mutant system.
First, for the resident population-trait dynamics (8, 9), it was proven by Boukal and
Krˇivan (1999) that the global attractor is located in plane M = {x = (x1, x2, x3) | e1x1 = e2x2}.
That is, when N (x) is multiple-valued, the manifold described in (4) becomes the hyperplane
M in this two-patch model (i.e. the single constraint in (4) becomes g(x) = 0 where
g(x) = e1x1 − e2x2). In fact, if the first patch has a higher intrinsic prey growth rate when
compared with the second patch (i.e. if r1 > r2, which we will assume from now on),
then they show that the attractor is the subset of M formed by the family of closed Lotka-
Volterra cycles of
dx1
dt
= x1 r1λ2 + r2λ1 − λ1λ2x3λ1 + λ2  (10)
dx3
dt
= x3 (e1x1 − m)
for which all points on the trajectory satisfy x3 ≥ (r1 − r2)/λ1 (see Figure 1A in Krˇivan and Eisner,
2006). Note that the dynamics for the second prey species need not be specified here since
dx2/dt = (e1/e2) (dx1/dt) on the attractor. Substituting the expressions from (8) for these
2 Alternatively, both prey species inhabit a single patch and there is no direct competition between these species.
Then vi is the proportion of time each predator forages for prey species i.
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derivatives implies that r1 − λ1v1x3 = r2 − λ2v2x3 when e1x1 = e2x2 and so the optimal
predator strategy on the attractor can be computed explicitly as:3
v1 =
r1 − r2 + λ2x3
(λ1 + λ2)x3
. (11)
That is, although any strategy v1 that satisfies (9) is optimal in the sense that it obtains
the highest possible payoff at each point along a trajectory, on the attractor the strategies
must satisfy (11). Thus, v1 depends not only on x1, x2 as in (9) but also on the predator
density x3 through (11). It is interesting to note that, on the attractor, predator fitness
(G = e1v1x1 + e2v2x2 − m) seems to depend explicitly through (11) on the predator population
density. However, substituting v1 from (11) into this formula shows that the actual value of
G = e1x1 − m is independent of x3 at all points of M for which x3 ≥ (r1 − r2)/λ1.
Thus, for the monomorphic predator–prey system with adaptive residents, the predator
habitat selection game combined with population dynamics selects the optimal strategy (11)
among infinitely many possible optimal strategies given by (9) when e1x1 = e2x2. The
primary question of interest to us is if, and in which sense, this optimal strategy is stable
with respect to invasions by mutants using a different strategy.
The fact that the resident population dynamics periodically fluctuate on the attractor
causes problems when applying the classical game theory that assumes either fixed
population sizes or exponentially growing populations (Cressman, 1992). Instead, we analyse
stability of the optimal strategy by assuming that the predator population is split
into residents (with density x3 and optimal strategy v) and mutants (with density x˜3 and
strategy v˜) that differ from residents only in their strategy, and then study the resultant
resident–mutant population dynamics:4
dx1
dt
= x1(r1 − λ1v1x3 − λ1v˜1x˜3)
dx2
dt
= x2(r2 − λ2v2x3 − λ2v˜2x˜3)
(12)
dx3
dt
= x3 (e1v1x1 + e2v2x2 − m)
dx˜3
dt
= x˜3 (e1v˜1x1 + e2v˜2x2 − m) .
3 In general, if the attractor is contained in the manifold M = {x ∈ Rn | g1(x) = 0, . . . , gl (x) = 0} as in (4), invariance
implies the additional constraint that
v ∈ S(x) = {u ∈ N(x) | 〈gi(x), f (x, u)〉 = 0, i = 1, . . . , l}
where g i is the gradient of partial derivatives of g i and f = ( f1, . . . , fn). For g(x) = e1x1 − e2x2, this constraint
yields (11). Although we do not use the Filippov concept of a solution, it turns out that (11) coincides with the
definition of the Filippov solution for the control system (8, 9), by the so-called ‘equivalent control method’
(Filippov, 1988; Vincent and Grantham, 1997; Dercole et al., 2007).
4 We will assume that strategy v˜ = (v˜1, v˜2) depends only on x1, x2, x3, and x˜3 and is such that the resident–mutant
system (12) has a solution for all initial conditions and for all t ≥ 0 (for example, this will be the case if v˜1 depends
continuously on x1, x2, x3, and x˜3). In particular, the resident–mutant population dynamics is autonomous in that
the vector field on the right-hand side of (12) has no explicit time dependence.
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It follows from (7) that mutants cannot spread (i.e. no mutant strategy u˜ can ‘strictly’
invade the resident system in that the proportion of invading predator strategies is never
larger than it is initially). Indeed, along any trajectory of (12), x˜3/x3 monotonically
decreases to a limiting value k* ≥ 0 that depends on initial conditions.
It is shown in Appendix 1 that all trajectories of the resident–mutant system (12)
converge to a global attractor that is contained in the hyperplane M = {(x1, x2, x3, x˜3) | e1x1
= e2x2}. The attractor is formed by closed cycles
5 of the Lotka-Volterra system
dx1
dt
= x1
r1λ2 + r2λ1 − (x3 + x˜3)λ1λ2
λ1 + λ2 (13)
dx3
dt
= x3(e1x1 − m)
for which all points on the trajectory satisfy the following constraints for some k* ≥ 0:
x3 ≥ max

r1 − r2
λ1 + k*(λ1v˜1 − λ2v˜2)
, 
r2 − r1
λ2 − k*(λ1v˜1 − λ2v˜2)

.
It is also shown there that the optimal strategy of the resident on the attractor is of the form
v1 =
r1 − r2 + x3(λ2 + k*(λ2v˜2 − λ1v˜1))
(λ1 + λ2)x3
, (14)
which generalizes the optimal foraging strategy (11) of the resident system [i.e. in the
absence of mutants (k* = 0), the optimal strategy (14) on the attractor is again given by
(11)].
It is interesting to analyse what happens when the mutant strategy v˜ is constant (i.e. when
all mutants spend fixed proportions of their time in each habitat regardless of the prey
density there). If residents adjust their strategy (11) to the overall population size x3 + x˜3,
i.e. if
v1 =
r1 − r2 + λ2(x3 + x˜3)
(λ1 + λ2)(x3 + x˜3)
(15)
on the attractor, then (14) implies that either x˜3 = 0 there or that the ‘mutant’ strategy is
identical to the resident strategy (v˜1 = v1). Thus, mutants that use a constant strategy must
die out as documented in Fig. 1 (left panels).
As formula (15) holds only when the trajectory is on the attractor, i.e. in the plane
e1x1 = e2x2, while off this plane the optimal strategy is either equal to 1 or to 0, it may seem
that preferences given by (15) are unlikely to be observed in simulations due to numerical
errors. However, this is not so, because in these cases the average value of the optimal
strategy converges to v1 given by (15) (Aubin and Cellina, 1984; Filippov, 1988) as the trajectory
fluctuates in the vicinity of the attractor from one side to the other.
At another extreme, if residents do not adjust their strategy to the presence of mutants
but continue to use (11), then from (14) mutants must use strategy v˜1 = λ2/(λ1 + λ2) on the
attractor to survive. In this case, the resident–mutant system is polymorphic with mutants
5 Note that we do not include dx2/dt or dx˜3/dt in this system (13), since e1x1 = e2x2 and x˜3 = k*x3.
Krˇivan and Cressman234
F
ig
. 1
.
Si
m
ul
at
io
n 
of
 th
e 
re
si
de
nt
–m
ut
an
t s
ys
te
m
 (1
2)
 w
it
h 
v˜ 1
=
λ
2
/(
λ
1
+
λ
2
).
 I
n 
th
e 
le
ft
-h
an
d 
pa
ne
ls
, v
1 i
s 
gi
ve
n 
by
 (9
) a
nd
 (1
5)
. I
n 
th
is
 c
as
e,
 c
on
di
ti
on
(1
4)
 d
oe
s 
no
t h
ol
d 
w
it
h 
a 
po
si
ti
ve
 k
* 
si
nc
e 
v˜ 1
≠
v 1
 o
n 
th
e 
at
tr
ac
to
r 
an
d 
m
ut
an
ts
 d
ie
 o
ut
. I
n 
th
e 
m
id
dl
e 
pa
ne
ls
, v
 is
 g
iv
en
 b
y 
(9
) a
nd
 (1
1)
. N
ow
 c
on
di
ti
on
(1
4)
 h
ol
ds
 w
it
h 
a 
po
si
ti
ve
 k
* 
an
d 
m
ut
an
ts
 s
ur
vi
ve
 i
n 
th
e 
sy
st
em
. 
T
he
 r
ig
ht
-h
an
d 
pa
ne
ls
 s
ho
w
 s
im
ul
at
io
ns
 w
he
re
 p
re
da
to
r 
st
ra
te
gy
 c
ha
ng
es
gr
ad
ua
lly
 w
it
h 
ch
an
gi
ng
 p
op
ul
at
io
n 
de
ns
it
ie
s 
ac
co
rd
in
g 
to
 t
he
 f
or
m
ul
a 
u 1
=
(e
1λ
1x
1
/e
2λ
2x
2
)µ
/(
1
+
(e
1λ
1x
1
/e
2λ
2x
2
)µ
) 
w
it
h 
th
e 
sw
it
ch
in
g 
pr
ec
is
io
n
µ
=
5.
 P
ar
am
et
er
s 
us
ed
 fo
r 
si
m
ul
at
io
ns
: r
1
=
1,
 r
2
=
0.
5,
 λ
1
=
1,
 λ
2
=
0.
8,
 m
=
0.
2,
 e
1
=
e 2
=
0.
1.
and residents eventually cycling in phase and in constant proportions (Fig. 1, middle
panels) along Lotka-Volterra trajectories on the attractor. In fact, for the parameters used
in Fig. 1, the lower middle panel indicates that this stable polymorphic cyclic state already
emerges on a population time-scale (i.e. in the medium term) before t = 10. On the
evolutionary time-scale, further decrease in the proportion of mutants is possible only
through fluctuations that perturb the system away from the attractor when residents use
optimal strategies. On the other hand, if residents switch strategies between 0 and 1 more
gradually on either side of the attractor, mutants tend to extinction on a population
time-scale (Fig. 1, right panels).
In summary, the introduction of mutant predator strategists does not alter the
fundamental properties of the limiting trajectories as Lotka-Volterra cycles adjusted to the
overall population size x3 + x˜3. It is in this sense that the existence of residents playing
the optimal strategy (as a function of the current population distribution) produces
an evolutionarily stable state that resists invasion by mutant strategists. Furthermore,
polymorphism can evolve, although, for this to occur here, the combined resident–mutant
predator strategy on the attractor must satisfy (14) with k* > 0. If resident predators use the
strategy given by (11) adjusted to the overall number of predators, no polymorphism will
evolve unless we are in the case where v˜1 = λ2/(λ1 + λ2).
At first glance, this latter case might seem very unlikely. However, if mutants disperse
from patch 1 to patch 2 with rate λ1 and from patch 2 to patch 1 with λ2, which corresponds
to their search rates in either patch, then the proportion of mutants in patch 1 will be given
exactly by this formula. For example, if the search rate in both patches is the same λ1 = λ2,
this formula predicts equal preferences of ‘naive’ mutants for either patch. Then the two
strategies, one which maximizes predator payoff and another which leads to undirected
predator movement, co-exist.
Optimal diet selection model
In this subsection, there is again one predator species foraging on two prey species, but in
contrast to our previous foraging model, we assume that the environment is homogeneous.
This means that a searching predator encounters individual prey sequentially and upon
each encounter it has to decide whether to accept the encountered prey type or to search for
a new one. Here the trade-off is not where to forage but whether to accept or to reject a prey.
Acceptance of a prey means that there is an associated cost to handle this prey type, called
the handling time, that plays an important role. Thus, the underlying linear functional
response in the foraging model of the previous subsection must be replaced by the Holling
type II functional response for multiple prey types. Following van Baalen et al. (2001), we will
consider a situation where a predator has a preferred prey type (prey type 1) on which it
always feeds, but there is also an alternative (allochtonous) prey type. We assume that
the alternative prey type density x2 is constant in the environment, i.e. not influenced by
predation. This leads to the preferred predator–prey resident dynamics
dx1
dt
= x1r1 − λ1u1x31 + h1λ1u1x1 + h2λ2u2x2 (16)
dx3
dt
= x3 e1λ1u1x1 + e2 λ2u2x21 + h1λ1u1x1 + h2λ2u2x2 − m .
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Here h i > 0 are handling times (i.e. the time a predator needs to process and consume a prey
item) and u i is the probability of accepting a prey of species i when encountered. That is,
the strategy space for the predator species is the two-dimensional unit square U ≡ {(u1, u2) |
0 ≤ u1 ≤ 1 and 0 ≤ u2 ≤ 1}. The meaning of other parameters and variables is the same as in
the previous subsection.
The fitness function for an individual predator using strategy v = (v1, v2) when
all predators in the monomorphic resident system use u = (u1, u2) is given by the
G-function:6
G(v ; u, x1, x2) =
e1λ1v1x1 + e2λ2v2x2
1 + h1v1λ1x1 + h2λ2v2x2
− m . (17)
It is a well-known result in optimal foraging theory (Charnov, 1976; Stephens and Krebs, 1986;
Houston and McNamara, 1999) that the strategy that maximizes the resident fitness always accepts
the better prey type, which we assume is prey species 1 (the prey type with the higher
e i /h i ratio is the better type and so we assume that e1/h1 > e2/h2), upon each encounter
(u1 = 1), while the alternative prey type will be accepted only when the density of prey
type 1 is below the threshold level x*1 = e2/(λ1(e1h2 − e2h1)). Specifically, the optimal
strategy is

(1,1) if x1 <
e2
λ1(e1h2 − e2h1)
(18)N (x) = (1,0) if x1 >
e2
λ1(e1h2 − e2h1)
{(1, u2) | 0 ≤ u2 ≤ 1} if x1 = e2
λ1(e1h2 − e2h1)
.
It has been shown (van Baalen et al., 2001; Krˇivan and Eisner, 2003; Krˇivan and Schmitz, 2003)
that the resident population-trait dynamics combining (16) with (18) can promote species
co-existence without stabilizing it at an equilibrium. Indeed, model (16) with fixed
preferences u1 and u2 is not persistent, because the Holling type II functional response
destabilizes population dynamics. However, when predators’ diet choice is optimal, a locally
asymptotically stable limit cycle emerges (the small amplitude limit cycle in Fig. 2A). This
locally stable limit cycle is partly formed by the ‘switching’ line x1 = x*1. Local stability
of this limit cycle implies that there is only one possible value of the optimal predator
strategy on this line due to the forward invariance of the cycle. That is, this strategy
can be determined by considering the population dynamics exactly as for the two-patch
predator–prey model [the explicit formula for u2 when x1 = x*2 was given in van Baalen
et al. (2001)].
Once again, we can ask if such a strategy is evolutionarily stable. We introduce a mutant
with a strategy that is different from the resident strategy. The mutant–resident system is
6 Note that the G-function again does not depend on the resident strategy or on the predator density. However,
unlike our first foraging model, G(v; u, x1, x2) is not a linear function of v and so cannot be expressed in the form of
a matrix game. Nevertheless, maximization methods can be used to obtain the optimal predator strategy in this
game against nature.
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Fig. 2. Simulation of the resident–mutant system (19). Panel (A) shows resident-trait dynamics.
There are two limit cycles. The small amplitude limit cycle (the inner cycle of the solid line) is locally
stable while the large amplitude limit cycle (dashed line) is unstable. Panel (B) shows that
when mutants (x˜3, thick dashed line) are introduced in small quantity at time t = 17 when the
resident-trait dynamics are on the attractor, mutants die out. The solid line is the resident prey density
(x1), while the dashed line is the resident predator density (x3). Here mutant predators use strategy
u˜1 = u˜2 = 1. Parameters used in simulations: x2 = 5, r1 = 1.2, λ1 = λ2 = 1, e1 = 1, e2 = 0.1, h1 = h2 = 0.2,
m = 1.
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dx1
dt
= x1 r1 − λ1u1x31 + h1u1λ1x1 + h2u2x2 −
λ1u˜1x˜3
1 + h1u˜1λ1x1 + h2λ2u˜2x2
dx3
dt
= x3 e1λ1u1x1 + e2λ2u2x21 + h1u1λ1x1 + h2λ2u2x2 − m (19)
dx˜3
dt
= x˜3 e1λ1u˜1x1 + e2λ2u˜2x21 + h1u˜1λ1x1 + h2λ2u˜2x2 − m .
Note that the predator G-function for the resident–mutant system is identical to that of the
resident system (i.e. G(v; u, u˜, x, x˜) = G(v; u, x) in (17)) and so does not depend on the
mutant’s strategy or its density. Thus, the optimal strategy remains (18).
Due to (7) applied to x3, the proportion of mutant predators will be strictly decreasing at
those times when mutants use a different strategy than predators (Fig. 2B). If the mutant
strategy is different than the resident’s optimal strategy off the switching line x1 = x*1, then at
every part of the limit cycle of the resident–mutant system that is not on the switching line,
we have x˜3/x3 is strictly decreasing. In fact, the proportion of mutants in the system
approaches 0 (i.e. the mutants go extinct). Moreover, introduction of mutant predators can
qualitatively change the evolutionary behaviour in this model even though they go extinct.
The reason for this is that the resident system also contains a large amplitude unstable limit
cycle (Fig. 2A), outside of which the system spirals outwards. The introduction of mutants
into a resident system that is initially inside the large unstable limit cycle can evolve
to population densities outside this cycle, which leads to instability. However, for this to
happen when the resident system is near the inner stable limit cycle, the number of mutants
cannot be too low initially.
PREDATOR–PREY MODELS WHERE BOTH SPECIES HAVE A PLASTIC TRAIT
The previous section considered games where only one species showed adaptive plasticity.
Now we will consider two predator–prey games where both predators and prey have an
adaptive plastic trait. Two different ‘escape’ strategies of prey under predation risk were
observed (reviewed in Schmitz et al., 2004). First, prey try to avoid predators by moving to less
riskier patches (e.g. Peacor and Werner, 2000). Second, prey reduce their encounter rate with
predators by reducing their activity level (e.g. Sih, 1980; Lima and Dill, 1990; Werner, 1992; Kotler et al., 2004).
In this section, we study evolutionary stability of optimal escape strategies.
Two-patch predator–prey model when both species are mobile
The two-patch foraging model of the previous section assumed that only predators are
mobile while prey are not. Following Krˇivan (1997), we consider now the case where both
species are mobile and residents are monomorphic. Suppose that the resident predators
with population density y use strategy v = (v1, v2) and resident prey with density x use
strategy u = (u1, u2).
7 The corresponding population dynamics for residents are
7 Both u1 + u2 and v1 + v2 = 1, since u i and v i give the respective proportions of their time that prey and predators
spend in patch i.
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dx
dt
= (r1 − λ1v1y)u1x + (r2 − λ2v2y)u2x
(20)
dy
dt
= (e1u1x − m1)v1y + (e2u2x − m2)v2y .
That is, in terms of G-functions, we have
G1(u˜; u, v, x, y) = (r1 − λ1v1y)u˜1 + (r2 − λ2v2y)u˜2
G2(v˜; u, v, x, y) = (e1u1x − m1)v˜1 + (e2u2x − m2)v˜2 .
Our first task is to determine the set of optimal strategies N (x, y) defined in (2) for these
G-functions of the resident system. We assume that, in this resident system, both prey
and predators choose optimal foraging strategies. Since the fitness of individual prey and
individual predators in (20) are both linear in u and in v, we can again use game-theoretic
methods based on payoff matrices to determine these optimal strategies. However, in
contrast to our previous models, now the predator’s payoff depends on the prey strategy u
as well as on the total prey density x. Similarly, prey payoff depends on the predator’s
strategy v and density y. For fixed densities x and y, these payoffs can now be represented
through the bimatrix game (Hofbauer and Sigmund, 1998) given by matrices A (for prey) and B (for
predator) respectively. For example, to obtain matrix A, prey fitness is written as
(r1 − λ1v1y)u1 + (r2 − λ2v2y)u2 = (r1 − λ1y)u1v1 + r1u1v2 + r2u2v1 + (r2 − λ2y)u2v2 .
The individual entries in matrix A are then the appropriate coefficients in the right-hand
side expansion. Combined with a similar calculation using predator fitness, we find that
A =  r1 − λ1yr2
r1
r2 − λ2y and B = 
e1x − m1
−m2
−m1
e2x − m2 .
The two matrices A and B are often written in the game-theoretic literature as a bimatrix
[A, BT ] =  r1 − λ1y, e1x − m1r2, −m1
r1, −m2
r2 − λ2y, e2x − m2 ,
where BT is the transpose of matrix B. That is, the rows in this bimatrix correspond to prey
strategy (first row means prey are in patch 1, second row means prey are in patch 2) and
similarly columns represent predator strategy. The first of the two expressions in the entries
of the bimatrix is the payoff for prey, while the second is payoff for predators. For example,
if prey are in patch 1 and predators in patch 2, the corresponding payoffs are given in the
upper right corner of the bimatrix. With this notation, the resident population dynamics
(20) can be rewritten in matrix form as
dx
dt
= x〈u, Av〉
(21)
dy
dt
= y〈v, Bu〉 .
From now on, assume that predator mortality in patch 1 is higher than in patch 2 (m1 > m2)
and prey intrinsic per capita growth rate in patch 1 is higher than that in patch 2 (r1 > r2).
8
8 For the other cases, see Krˇivan (1997).
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From standard techniques for bimatrix games (Hofbauer and Sigmund, 1998), [A, BT ] has a unique
Nash equilibrium pair (u, v) unless x = (m1 − m2)/e1 or y = (r1 − r2)/λ1. Specifically, if prey
density is so low that x < (m1 − m2)/e1, then it is always better for predators to be in patch 2
because the higher predator mortality rate in patch 1 cannot be compensated for by a higher
growth rate there even if all prey stay in patch 1 (i.e. e1u1x − m1 < e2u2x − m2 for all
0 ≤ u1 ≤ 1). This then implies that all prey are better off in patch 1, as their growth rate
is higher there and there are no predators (since r1 > r2 − λ2y). That is, the only Nash
equilibrium is (u, v) with u1 = 1 and v1 = 0. On the other hand, if x ≥ (m1 − m2)/e1, then both
predators and prey will be in patch 1 (i.e. u1 = v1 = 1) if predator density is so low that
y < (r1 − r2)/λ1. Finally, if both population densities are high enough [i.e. when x ≥ (m1 − m2)/
e1 and y ≥ (r1 − r2)/λ1 with one of these a strict inequality], predators and prey will distribute
themselves between the two patches according to the unique Nash equilibrium (u, v) given by
u1 =
m1 − m2 + e2x
(e1 + e2)x
, v1 =
r1 − r2 + λ2y
(λ1 + λ2)y
. (22)
At this distribution, prey in patch 1 receive the same payoff as prey in patch 2 (and likewise
for predators). It is interesting to note that the optimal predator strategy v1 in (22) is exactly
the same when prey are immobile and the population dynamics are on the attractor (see 11).
This shows that prey movement does not influence the optimal predator distribution.
There are several reasons to assert that this Nash equilibrium is the foraging strategy
chosen by each species at fixed densities x and y. First, (u, v) is the optimal strategy in the
sense that it is the only strategy pair where individuals of each species maximize their per
capita growth rate given the current distribution of the other species. Second, since (u, v)
is a weak evolutionarily stable strategy, (u, v) is globally asymptotically stable for the
continuous-time best response dynamics (Krˇivan et al., 2008) that model dispersal behaviour
whereby individuals move to the patch with the higher payoff. Thus, if dispersal occurs
on a much faster time-scale than changes in population size (i.e. dispersal is effectively
instantaneous), then we expect that each species strategy is at its Nash equilibrium.
To summarize these results for the resident system from the game-theoretic perspective,
we have (Krˇivan, 1997)

(v*1, u*1) if x >
m1 − m2
e1λ1
, y >
r1 − r2
λ1
,
(1, 1) if x >
m1 − m2
e1λ1
, y <
r1 − r2
λ1
,
(1, 0) if x <
m1 − m2
e1λ1
,
N (x, y) =
{(1, u1) | u1 ∈ [0, u*1]} if x = m1 − m2e1λ1 , y >
r1 − r2
λ1
,
{(1, u1) | u1 ∈ [0, 1]} if x = m1 − m2e1λ1 , y ≤
r1 − r2
λ1
,
{(v1, 1) | v1 ∈ [v*1, 1]} if x > m1 − m2e1λ1 , y =
r1 − r2
λ1
.
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The resident population dynamics (20) was analysed by Boukal and Krˇivan (1999) when
residents use the above optimal foraging strategy. They show that the dynamics converge to
a global attractor formed by solutions of the Lotka-Volterra model
dx
dt
= x r1λ2 + r2λ1λ1 + λ2 −
λ1λ2
λ1 + λ2
y
(23)
dy
dt
= y e1e2e1 + e2 x −
e1m2 + e2m1
e1 + e2 
that are contained in the region of the population density phase space where x ≥ (m1 − m2)/
e1 and y ≥ (r1 − r2)/λ1. In particular, u1 and v1 given by (22) satisfy 0 ≤ u1 ≤ 1 and 0 ≤ v1 ≤ 1
on the attractor.
We now study invasibility of this resident system by a subpopulation of rare mutants for
both species. The corresponding resident–mutant population dynamics when residents
using the optimal strategy pair (u, v) are invaded by mutants of both species using u˜ and v˜
respectively is
dx
dt
= (r1 − λ1v1y − λ1v˜1y˜)u1x + (r2 − λ2v2y − λ2v˜2y˜)u2x
dy
dt
= (e1u1x + e1u˜1x˜ − m1)v1y + (e2u2x + e2u˜2x˜ − m2)v2y
(24)
dx˜
dt
= (r1 − λ1v1y − λ1v˜1y˜)u˜1x˜ + (r2 − λ2v2y − λ2v˜2y˜)u˜2x˜
dy˜
dt
= (e1u1x + e1u˜1x˜ − m1)v˜1y˜ + (e2u2x + e2u˜2x˜ − m2)v˜2y˜ .
Here, x and y are the densities of the resident prey and predator populations respectively
and x˜ and y˜ are those of the mutant populations. The bimatrix game faced by the residents
is now
r1 − λ1y − λ1v˜1y˜, e1x + e1u˜1x˜ − m1r2 − λ2v˜2y˜, −m1 + e1u˜1x˜
r1 − λ1v˜1y˜, −m2 + e2u˜2x˜
r2 − λ2y − λ2v˜2y˜, e2x + e2u˜2x˜ − m2 .
That is, the residents will adjust their optimal strategy to the overall population size.
In place of (22), the unique Nash equilibrium for this adjusted bimatrix game is
u1 =
m1 − m2 + e2(x + x˜) − u˜1x˜(e1 + e2)
(e1 + e2)x (25)
v1 =
r1 − r2 + λ2(y + y˜) − v˜1y˜(λ1 + λ2)
(λ1 + λ2)y
provided 0 ≤ u1, v1 ≤ 1. The corresponding population dynamics for the overall prey and
predator densities is
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d(x + x˜)
dt
= (x + x˜) r1λ2 + r2λ1λ1 + λ2 −
λ1λ2
λ1 + λ2
(y + y˜) (26)
d(y + y˜)
dt
= (y + y˜) e1e2e1 + e2 (x + x˜) −
e1m2 + e2m1
e1 + e2  ,
the same dynamics as on the global attractor of the resident system (23). Thus, if mutant
strategies are such that the adjusted Nash equilibrium satisfies 0 ≤ u1, v1 ≤ 1 along the entire
trajectory, then the introduction of mutants will not qualitatively change the resident
dynamics. Moreover, from (24), along this trajectory
dy˜/y
dt
=
y˜
y
((e1u1x + e1u˜1x˜ − m1)(v˜1 − v1) + (e2u2x + e2u˜2x˜ − m2)(v˜2 − v2))
=
y˜
y
((e1u1x + e1u˜1x˜ − m1) − (e2u2x + e2u˜2x˜ − m2))(v˜1 − v1) = 0 ,
since e1u1x + e1u˜1x˜ − m1 = e2u2x + e2u˜2x˜ − m2. Similarly, (dx˜/x)/dt = 0. In other words,
the proportion of mutants in both species remains constant along this Lotka-Volterra
trajectory and, on the attractor, both residents and mutants will follow Lotka-
Volterra cycling dynamics. Thus, the mutants will not die out on a population time-scale,
although their proportion in the population will not increase either. On an evolutionary
time-scale, continued perturbations away from the attractor can again eventually lead to
extinction of the mutants as in our previous two-patch foraging model where only the
resident predators are adaptive.
The question remains as to how the resident–mutant system (24) evolves when u1 or v1 in
(25) does not satisfy 0 ≤ u1, v1 ≤ 1. In this case, the only Nash equilibrium will be such that at
least one of the two populations will occupy one patch only. For example, if u1 > 1 in (25),
then e1x + e1u˜1x˜ − m1 < −m2 + e2u˜2x˜ and −m1 + e1u˜1x˜ < e2x + e2u˜2x˜ − m2. In other words,
patch 2 strictly dominates patch 1 for predators (i.e. predators are better off in patch 2 no
matter what strategy u1 the resident prey use in that e1u1x + e1u˜1x˜ − m1 < e2u2x + e2u˜2x˜ − m2
for all 0 ≤ u1 ≤ 1). Thus, the unique Nash equilibrium has v1 = 0 and so
dy˜/y
dt
=
y˜
y
((e1u1x + e1u˜1x˜ − m1) − (e2u2x + e2u˜2x˜ − m2))v˜1 ≤ 0
with equality if and only if v˜1 = 0. That is, along this part of the trajectory, the proportion
of mutant predators strictly decreases unless v˜1 is the same as the resident predator strategy.
The last statement can also be shown if u1 < 0 in (25).
In summary, (dy˜/y)/dt ≤ 0 along every trajectory and so y˜/y approaches a limit k* ≥ 0.
Similarly, x˜/x approaches a limit l* ≥ 0. Moreover, the limiting behaviour of the system is the
same as the resident system with x and y replaced by (1 + l*)x and (1 + k*)y respectively.
Thus, the combined resident–mutant dynamics approaches the global attractor formed by
Lotka-Volterra cycles of (26) contained in the region where (1 + l*)x ≥ (m1 − m2)/e1 and
(1 + k*)y ≥ (r1 − r2)/λ1. Again, we find that the existence of residents playing their optimal
strategy yields an evolutionarily stable state on a population time-scale comprised of a fixed
proportion of mutants in each species.
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A predator–prey model with adaptive activity levels
In this subsection, we consider evolutionary stability of a predator–prey model in a
homogeneous environment where both prey and predators change their activity levels to
maximize their fitness. Following Krˇivan (2007), the monomorphic resident dynamics is
dx
dt
= (r1u + r2 − (λ1u + λ2v)y) x = x〈(u, 1 − u), A(v, 1 − v)〉
(27)
dy
dt
= (e(λ1u + λ2v)x − (m1 + m2v)) y = y 〈(v, 1 − v), B(u, 1 − u)〉 ,
where 0 ≤ u ≤ 1 (0 ≤ v ≤ 1) denotes prey (predator) activity. This dynamics models the
foraging–predation risk trade-offs undertaken by both species. In particular, with all
parameters positive (except possibly r2), increased prey activity (u) increases prey growth
rate (r1u + r2) but it also increases the encounter rate with predators (λ1u + λ2v). Similarly,
increasing predator activity (v) increases both predator growth rate (e(λ1u + λ2v)x) and
mortality rate (m1 + m2v).
9
The bimatrix [A, BT ] of the underlying predator–prey game is
r1 + r2 − (λ1 + λ2)y, eλ2x − m2 + eλ1x − m1r2 − λ2y, eλ2x − m2 − m1
r1 + r2 − λ1y, eλ1x − m1
r2, −m1  ,
where rows describe the strategy of prey and columns the strategy of predators. That is, the
first row (column) corresponds to strategy u = 1 (respectively, v = 1) where prey (predator) is
fully active while the second row (column) is for completely inactive prey (predator) with
u = 0 (respectively, v = 0).
For each fixed prey and predator densities that are different from xs = m2/(eλ2) and
ys = r1/λ1, the unique Nash equilibrium (u, v) is at a vertex of the unit square. Specifically,
we have
u = 1 if y <
r1
λ1
0 if y >
r1
λ1
and v = 1 if x >
m2
eλ2
0 if x <
m2
eλ2
. (28)
When x = xs (y = ys), the optimal strategy of predators (prey) is not uniquely defined and
can be anywhere between 0 and 1. In this case, there are infinitely many Nash equilibria
(if x = xs and y = ys, all points in the unit square are Nash equilibria). If residents use
their optimal strategy, the long-term evolution of (5) can be quite complex, depending on
9 Model (27) assumes that the encounter rate between prey and predators is a linear function of prey and
predator activity. Several other functional dependencies have been considered in the literature (Yapp, 1955; Skellam,
1958; Werner and Anholt, 1993; Kr˜ivan and Sirot, 2004). For example, Yapp (1955) considered prey and predators moving
at characteristic velocities u and v in a two-dimensional space. Assuming that these animals have a circular
perceptual field and that the direction of predator movement is randomly and uniformly distributed with respect to
prey movement direction, he derived that the encounter rate of a prey individual with a predator is proportional to
√u2 + v2. In our model (27), this formula was approximated by a linear relationship for mathematical tractability.
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the choice of parameters (see Figure 3 of Krˇivan, 2007). However, when λ2/m2 < λ1/m1, r1/λ1 >
r2/λ2, and r2 > 0 (conditions that we will assume from now on), the resident population
dynamics converge to the equilibrium E = (xs, ys) (for a corresponding Lyapunov function,
see Appendix 2) and at this equilibrium the species preferences are u* = (m1λ2)/(m2λ1) and
v* = (r2λ1)/(r1λ2).
Once again we ask whether adaptive residents can resist invasion by mutants playing
different strategies u˜ and v˜ for prey and predator respectively. Now, the resident–mutant
population dynamics is
dx
dt
= (r1u + r2 − (λ1u + λ2v)y − (λ1u + λ2v˜)y˜) x = x〈(u, 1 − u), A(v, 1 − v)〉
dy
dt
= (e(λ1u + λ2v)x + e(λ1u˜ + λ2v)x˜ − (m1 + m2v)) y = y〈(v, 1 − v), B(u, 1 − u)〉
(29)
dx˜
dt
= (r1u˜ + r2 − (λ1u˜ + λ2v)y − (λ1u˜ + λ2v˜)y˜) x˜ = x˜〈(u˜, 1 − u˜), A(v, 1 − v)〉
dy˜
dt
= (e(λ1u + λ2v˜)x + e(λ1u˜ + λ2v˜)x˜ − (m1 + m2v˜)) y˜ = y˜〈(v˜, 1 − v˜), B(u, 1 − u)〉 .
That is, the bimatrix [A, BT ] from the adaptive residents’ perspective is adjusted by the
mutants according to
A =  r1 + r2 − (λ1 + λ2)y − λ1y˜ − λ2v˜y˜r2 − λ2y − λ2v˜y˜
r1 + r2 − λ1y − λ1y˜ − λ2v˜y˜
r2 − λ2v˜y˜ 
B = eλ2x − m2 + eλ1x − m1 + eλ1u˜x˜ + eλ2x˜eλ1x − m1 + eλ1u˜x˜
eλ2x − m2 − m1 + eλ1u˜x˜ + eλ2x˜
−m1 + eλ1u˜x˜  .
The unique Nash equilibrium is given by (28) with x and y replaced by x + x˜ and y + y˜
respectively [see (34) in Appendix 2]. That is, adaptive residents simply base their decision
on the overall population numbers including mutants. From Appendix 2, mutants cannot
increase their proportion of the population (i.e. (dx˜/x)/dt ≤ 0 and (dy˜/y)/dt ≤ 0) and all
trajectories of (29) converge to the set where x + x˜ = m2/(eλ2) and y + y˜ = r1/λ1.
In summary, the existence of adaptive residents forces the overall population sizes to their
equilibrium values (xs, ys). It is in this sense that the existence of residents using optimal
behaviour implies that the system is evolutionarily stable.
DISCUSSION
This article addresses a complex relationship between plasticity, population dynamics,
and evolutionary stability in predator–prey Lotka-Volterra type models. Static evolutionary
stability conditions for multiple species are much more difficult than for a single species. For
instance, suppose that prey fitness depends only on the strategy used by predators as the
classical Lotka-Volterra model assumes (i.e. there is no prey density dependence). It is then
unclear why, when the prey population departs from its equilibrium strategy, it should
return to this equilibrium, as its fitness does not depend on its own strategy. In this article,
we have adopted the approach that the adaptive resident system will be stable at current
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population densities in that residents must have no incentive to change their strategy.
From this assumption, it is then clear the residents, who all use an optimal strategy, must
maximize their own fitness given these densities. This then makes the resident’s strategy a
(possibly multivalued) function of population densities. This function is then fed back to
the population dynamics, which produces a resident population dynamics and we ask
whether this system can be invaded by mutant strategists.
In these predator–prey models that consider explicit resident–mutant population
dynamics, there is yet another complication in that the resident system on its own often
evolves to periodic fluctuations. Since we can no longer expect a single evolutionarily stable
state in such circumstances, we examine instead whether the introduction of mutants into
these fluctuating environments fundamentally alters this qualitative behaviour. Our main
results show that, again in this setting, the mutant population cannot increase relative to
residents and that, furthermore, the combined resident–mutant population dynamics
eventually follow the same periodic fluctuations when the resident system has a globally
stable equilibrium or a global attractor consisting of a family of limit cycles. It is in this
latter sense that the existence of adaptive residents in our optimal foraging predator–prey
models produces an evolutionarily stable system.
Our modelling approach to optimal adaptive foraging assumes that individual residents
change their behaviour on a much faster time-scale than the population dynamics changes
species densities. This is reasonable for our models where individual behaviour is typically
characterized by choice of habitat or activity levels. Several experimental set-ups in which
distance between patches is relatively small or prey rapidly change their behaviour under
predation risk (e.g. Murdoch, 1969; Milinski, 1979; Fraser and Huntingford, 1986; Holbrook and Schmitt, 1988;
Brown and Alkon, 1990; Brown, 1998; Lima, 1998a, 1998b; Sih, 1998; Peacor and Werner, 2001; Werner and Peacor, 2003;
Berec et al., 2006) conform to this assumption. There are also examples of rapid morphological
and physiological adaptations in some prey species (e.g. Wikelski and Thom, 2000; Yalden, 2000; Relyea and
Auld, 2004; Losos et al., 2006). Evolution of phenotypes that are behaviourally flexible and that
require changes in genotype [i.e. evolution of phenotypic plasticity (e.g. Schlichting and Pigliucci,
1998; Miner et al., 2005)] runs on an evolutionary (slow) time-scale. For such systems, the adaptive
dynamics method (e.g. Dieckmann and Law, 1996; Geritz et al., 1998; Abrams, 2001; Cressman and Hofbauer, 2005;
Vincent and Brown, 2005; Dercole and Rinaldi, 2008) seems more suitable. Here, population densities
quickly attain stable equilibrium values for current phenotypes and the main point of
interest is the dynamics of population behaviour that is often described by the canonical
equation of adaptive dynamics. Equilibria of this dynamics are then tested for their
evolutionary stability by confirming that they cannot be successfully invaded by rare
mutants (e.g. Mylius and Diekmann, 1995; Metz et al., 2008) and that evolutionary branching does not
occur (Geritz et al., 1997; Claessen and Dieckmann, 2002). In most of our models based on the time-scales
reversed, population densities cycle on an attractor rather than converge to equilibrium and,
although mutants can survive in our predator–prey systems on a population time-scale,
their survival does not qualitatively change the population dynamics.
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APPENDIX 1: ON THE ATTRACTOR OF MODEL (12)
To prove that the trajectories of model (12) converge to the global attractor contained in the
hyperplane M = {(x1, x2, x3, x˜3) | e1x1 = e2x2}, we generalize the method of Boukal and
Krˇivan (1999) by introducing the function
V(x1, x2, x3, x˜3) = λ2 e1x1 − m − m ln 
e1x1
m  + λ1(e2x2 − m − m ln 
e2x2
m 
+ λ1λ2x3 − (r1λ2 + r2λ1) − (r1λ2 + r2λ1) ln λ1λ2x3r1λ2 + r2λ1 + λ1λ2x˜3 .
We obtain the following two properties of V. First, V(x1, x2, x3, x˜3) > 0 except at
equilibrium E where
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Vme1 , 
m
e2
, 
r1λ2 + r2λ1
λ1λ2
, 0 = 0 .
Second, from (12), the derivative of V along trajectories of the resident–mutant system is
dV
dt
(x1, x2, x3, x˜3) = −(e1x1 − e2x2) ((r1λ2 + r2λ1)v1 − r1λ2) . (30)
Since v1 = 1 when e1x1 > e2x2 and v1 = 0 when e1x1 < e2x2, dV/dt < 0 except at points
with e1x1 = e2x2 (where it is 0). That is, V is a (non-strict) Lyapunov function. Thus, the
omega-limit set of any trajectory of (12) (i.e. the global attractor of (12)) is contained in the
hyperplane M. Due to the LaSalle invariance principle (Shevitz and Paden, 1994), the omega-limit
set of model (12) is contained in the largest invariant subset of M. Thus, we will study now
invariant subsets of M.
Points on a trajectory of (12) in an invariant subset of M must satisfy (d/dt) (e1x1) = (d/dt)
(e2x2) when e1x1 = e2x2. Substituting these conditions into (12) yields
v1 =
r1 − r2 + λ2x3 + x˜3(λ2v˜2 − λ1v˜1)
(λ1 + λ2)x3
(31)
on the attractor. Since x˜3 = k*x3 for some k* there, we have (14). Moreover, since 0 ≤ v1 ≤ 1,
we obtain the constraint
x3 ≥ max r1 − r2λ1 + k*(λ1v˜1 − λ2v˜2) , 
r2 − r1
λ2 − k*(λ1v˜1 − λ2v˜2) .
Conversely, if v1 in (14) is outside the interval 0 ≤ v1 ≤ 1, then the trajectory is at a point
in M where (d/dt) (e1x1) ≠ (d/dt) (e2x2). That is, such points do not belong to an invariant
subset of M and the trajectory must leave M.
Substituting the strategy (14) into model (12) leads to the following population dynamics
on the attractor:
dx1
dt
= x1
r1λ2 + r2λ1 − (x3 + x˜3)λ1λ2
λ1 + λ2 (32)
dx3
dt
= x3(e1x1 − m) .
It follows that trajectories of (32) are closed Lotka-Volterra cycles. Therefore, the attractor
is formed by a family of these cycles that are contained in M.
APPENDIX 2: ON THE ATTRACTOR OF MODEL (27)
Here we show that the resident population dynamics (27) when both species are adaptive
converges to the equilibrium (xs, ys) = (m2/(eλ2), r1/λ1) when r1/λ1 > r2/λ2, λ2/m2 < λ1/m1
and r2 > 0. To see this, consider the following function for x > 0 and y > 0:
V (x, y) = x − xs − xs ln xxs +
1
e y − ys − ys ln
y
ys . (33)
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V (x, y) = 0 at the point (xs, ys) and is positive otherwise. From (27),
dV
dt
=
(r2λ1 − r1λ2v) (eλ2x − m2) + (λ1y − r1) (m2uλ1 − λ2m1)
eλ1λ2
.
Substitution of the optimal strategy (u, v) given by (28) yields dV/dt < 0 if (x, y) ≠ (xs, ys).
Thus v is a strict Lyapunov function for the system and so (xs, ys) is globally asymptotically
stable.
Next, we show that all trajectories of (29) converge to the set where x + x˜ = m2/(eλ2) and
y + y˜ = r1/λ1. From this resident–mutant system, we calculate
dx˜/x
dt
=
x˜
x
(u˜ − u)(r1 − λ1(y + y˜))
and
dy˜/y
dt
=
y˜
y
(v˜ − v)(eλ2(x + x˜) − m2) .
Since residents use the strategies
u = 
1 if y + y˜ <
r1
λ1
0 if y + y˜ >
r1
λ1
and v = 
1 if x + x˜ >
m2
eλ2
0 if x + x˜ <
m2
eλ2
, (34)
(dx˜/x)/dt ≤ 0 and (dy˜/y)/dt ≤ 0. Thus limt →∞ x˜/x = k* ≥ 0 and limt →∞ y˜/y = l* ≥ 0.
The Lyapunov function (33) can be extended to the resident–mutant model by redefining
V as
V (x, y, x˜, y˜) = x + x˜ − xs − xs ln xxs +
1
e y + y˜ − ys − ys ln
y
ys ,
which satisfies V (xs, ys, 0, 0) = 0 and is positive otherwise. The derivative of V along
trajectories of model (29) is
dV
dt
=
(r2λ1 − r1λ2v) (eλ2(x + x˜) − m2) + (λ1(y + y˜) − r1)(m2uλ1 − λ2m1)
eλ1λ2
.
Since r2λ1 − r1λ2 < 0 and m2λ1 − m1λ2 > 0, dV/dt < 0 by (34) except at points where
x + x˜ = m2/(eλ2) and y + y˜ = r1/λ1. Thus, the attractor of (29) is contained in the latter set. In
fact, since both x˜/x and y˜/y approach a limit as t →∞, each trajectory converges to a single
limit point in this set.
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